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TOWARDS TAMPER DETECTION AND CLASSIFICATION WITH ROBUST 
WATERMARKS 
Henry Knowles, Dominique Winne, Nishan Canagarajah, David Bull 
Image Communications Group, Centre for Communications Research, University of Bristol, 
Woodland Rd, Bristol BS8 1UB. UK 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we present a novel wavelet-based double water- 
marking system for the detection and subsequent characterisation 
of the tampering ofimages. Most tamper detection techniques use 
fragile watermarks. However, our previous work showed that this 
type of watermark is frequently completely destroyed by compres- 
sion, which in many cases is undesirable. In addition, it gives little 
or no information about the nature of the attack. We propose using 
two robust watermarks, one inserted at the embedder, the other at 
the detector. The second watermark is used as a reference with 
which the first watermark may be compared. This allows addi- 
tional information not previously available about the nature ofthe 
attack to be obtained. The use of a robust strategy prevents the 
watermark being easily destroyed, but instead allows the system to 
continue to perform after significant attacks. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Initially, image authentication used fragile watermarks that were 
insened either in the spatial domain [7], the wavelet domain [9] or 
the DCT domain [IO]. Whilst these techniques frequently provide 
accurate tamper resolution. they do not permit the compression 
of the image using lossy compression techniques such as IPEG 
compression, nor do  they provide information about the nature of 
the attack. A considerable amount of attention has been given to 
the problem of overcoming the compression issue. For example, 
Winne et al. [XI offer a system where compression up to a fixed 
Quality Factor is permissible by relaxing the tamper detection cri- 
terion used. Ideally, some measure invariant to compression would 
be watermarked, such that the watermark would be unaffected by 
the compression, but destroyed by another form of attack. Lin er 
al. [2,3] use the relationship between DCT coefficients before and 
after compression to authenticate images, whilst various authors 
have considered using compression invariant features such as the 
moments of watermark blocks 151 and the use of feature points 
which are essential to the images semantic content, but should be 
unaffected by compression [I] .  However, both of these techniques 
require additional information to be stored, which is in many situ- 
ations unacceptable. Additionally, none of these methods provide 
information about the nature of the attack. We therefore propose 
an algorithm which uses two robust watermarks, one insened at 
the embedder, and the other at the detector, lo derive additional 
information about the nature of any attack to which the image has 
been subjected. 
In the next section (Section 2 ) .  we present details of how our 
algorithm works and a justification for the method. This is fol- 
lowed by Section 3, where we present some experimenlal results 
to demonstrate the potential ofthe algorithm. In Section 4 conclu- 
sions are presented, along with some ideas for future work. 
2. ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION 
2.1. Watermark Embedding 
Watermark insertion is performed in the wavelet domain using the 
Noise Visibility Function (NVF) based model of Voloshynovskiy 
el ai. [6 ] .  The NVF is calculated in the wavelet domain on a sub- 
band-by-suhband basis as: 
(1) 
1 
1 + 0 Local Variance(i,j) N V F ( i , j )  = 
where 0 = D/Max Variance, 50 < D < 100. Thus the water- 
mark strength, S(i,j) is given by: 
S ( i , j )  = & ( , , , ( I  - N V F ( i , j ) )  + S J , , , , N V F ( ? . ~ )  (2) 
where represents the strength for the edge regions in decom- 
position level 1 and orientation 0, and S J ~ , ~  is a similar measure 
for the flat regions. Finally, the watermarked image coefficient 
I ' ( i , j ) ,  may be defined as: 
f'(i,j) = f ( i , j )  + w ( i , j ) S ( i , j )  (3 )  
where I(i,j) is the original image coefficient. and w( i , j )  is the 
watermark wavelet coefficient. The watermark is tiled over the 
image in blocks of 32-by-32 pixels and is defined as w ( i , j )  E 
[ - I :  I]. The purpose of the tiling is to enable localisation of the 
attacks. whilst the block size is set such that the watermark will be 
more robust to attacks, without becoming so large that the locali- 
sation is not meaningful. 
2.2. Watermark Estimation 
The watermark is extracted using wavelet denoising techniques as 
given in Moulin er al. [4J. An estimate ofthe watermark (or noise) 
-free image is determined using the thresholding process. This 
estimate is then subtracted from the received, watermarked and 
possibly attacked image to give an estimate of the watermark. Ei- 
ther soft or hard wavelet thresholding may be used. The measure 
used to judge the degradation of the watermark is the coherence or 
normalised correlation coefficient, p: 
(4) 
where R denotes the variance or covariance. Thus for two identical 
signals (invariant to scaling). the coherence will be I ,  whereas for 
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two uncorrelated signals, the coherence will be 0. Negative coher- 
ence implies that the signals are correlated but have been shifted 
in phase by n rads. In order to maximise the potential of the al- 
gorithm to work with as severe an attack as possible, the fact that 
the watermark is fully defined at the detector is used. Instead of 
blindly estimating the watermark and image variances as is done 
for robust watermarks [4,61, a selection of different thresholds are 
tried. and the one that maximises the coherence between the esti- 
mated watermark and the original is chosen. The range of thresh- 
olds used will vary between the minimum and maximum wavelet 
coefficients in the current watermark block. The same threshold 
is used for all coefficients in a given watermark block. Thus the 
watermark extraction process may be defined as: 
G = max[Coherence({l” - Threshold(l”,T)}, w) ]  (5 )  
T 
2.3. Algorithm Overview 
Results from preliminary experiments showed that firstly the val- 
ues obtained for p. the coherence of the estimated watermark with 
the original watermark, varied considerably over a given subband. 
Different attacks caused a similar variation. The second finding 
was that NVF of the untampered watermarked image was very 
similar to the NVF of the original image. From the first obser- 
vation, there is clearly a need for a reference to decide whether p 
has assumed a particular value due to an attack or the statistical 
content of the watermark block. The second observation provides 
an insight into what the solution might he. By adding a second 
watermark to the image at the receiver and then immediately esli- 
mating it, a reference to what the first watermark would have been 
had there been no attack is obtained. 
In summary. the primary watermark ( W I )  is embedded (see 
Section 2.1) in the original image I ,  to form the watermarked im- 
age, 1’. The watermarked image is stored. and whilst in storage 
may or may not be attacked. An estimate of the primary water- 
mark (&) is generated as described in Section 2.2 from the pos- 
sibly attacked, watermarked image I“ .  The coherence (see Equa- 
tion 4) of WI with WI is denoted pi .  The second watermark, w2 
is now added to I” and immediately estimated as before to give 
Gz. Again the coherence is calculated between w2 and d2 to give 
p2. By comparing pl and p2. information about the nature of the 
attack can be gained. It is important to note that tul and w2 are 
chosen 10 be uncorrelated with each other. 
D lor lena: i2k 01 o lorlena: nothino 
3. RESULTS 
Results for a variety of different attacks are presented in this sec- 
tion. The attacks considered are: no attack, compression using the 
JPEG2000 algorithm with a compression ratio of 1 0 0  I ,  compres- 
sion using the JPEG baseline with a quality factor of 80, and an 
unsharp mask as found in the MATLAB Image Processing Tool- 
box. 
Results for p l  are given in Figure 1 and also summarised in 
Table I, It can be seen that there is considerable variation in pl 
across the subhands. However, other more positive trends are also 
visible. A comparison of Figure I(a) with I(b) (or Table I(a) with 
I(b)) shows that the JPEG2000 compression has severely affected 
the watermark, and thus the value obtained for p ,  is very low in the 
high frequency subbands (about O.l) ,  whilst the value for the un- 
tampered case is much higher, about 0.6 for the level 1 subbands. 
The unsharp mask (Figure I(c)) reduces the watermark coherence 
lb) la) 
(C) (d) 
Figure I: p~ for Lena for attacks: (a) Compression using 
]PEG2000 with compression ratio of 100:l. (b) No attack, (c) 
UnsharD mask. and (d) Compression using JPEG baseline with a 
quality factor of 80 
only very slightly. whilst the JPEG baseline attack (Figure I(d)) is 
in between the unsharp and JPEG2000 attacks. These observations 
confirm what might have been intuitively expected. Compressing 
an image using JPEG2000 with a compression ratio of 10O:l will 
result in a significant loss of information, especially in the low 
scalehigh frequency subbands. and this is as observed. The JPEG 
baseline compression is less severe, and so will result in a lower, 
but still visible change, and again most of the information lost will 
be in the higher frequency subbands. An unsharp mask however, 
has the effect of amplifying the high frequency subbands. As the 
coherence is a linear function and invariant to variance changes 
in X and Y (see Equation 4). one would not expect p ,  to change 
significantly. For example, attacking a particular subband by mul- 
tiplying i t  by a constant will not affect the value of 01. What will 
affect p ,  is the rounding and clipping that will take place when 
the image is convened back into the pixel domain. Low pass fil- 
tering, for example, may alter the image such that after rounding 
to integer values in the pixel domain, the high frequency wavelet 
coefficients are all, or nearly all, zero. Thus pl will be affected. 
However. the unsharp mask is unlikely to result in much clipping 
taking place (e.g. causing pixel values to lie outside the range 0- 
255), so as was stated earlier the effects of this attack on p l  will 
not be great. This may explain why the changes to pl  are small 
when compared lo the changes in PSNR as given in Table 3. 
If the results in Figure 2 and Table 2 are now examined, addi- 
tional information can now be obtained. It can be seen that those 
attacks which removed high frequency information (Figures 2(a) 
and 2(d)) have high values for p2,  and indeed the more information 
that was removed, the higher p2 becomes. In comparison. the un- 
sharp mask, which amplified the high frequency information, has 
a lower value for pz. This effect is particularly clear in the Level 1 
& 2 diagonal subbands (compare Table I(c) with Table 2(c)). The 
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Table 1: Table showing pl at different decomposition levels and in different subbands for Lena after attack (a) J2K d . 0 1 ,  (h) nothing, (c) 
Unshaip mask; and (d) P E G  compression with QF = 80 
(a) (b) (C) (d) 
Table 2 Table showing p2 at different decomposition levels and in different subbands for Lena after attack (a) J2K r=O.O1, (h) nothing, (c) 
Unsharp mask, and (d) JPEG compression with QF = 80 
value of pz for the,untampered case is largely unchanged. These 
ohservations may be explained heuristically as follows. As a re- 
sult of the attacks, the amount of energy in the subbands changes, 
especially, for the attacks in question, in the high frequency s u b  
hands. However, the masking function (see Equation I )  is non- 
linear with energy (variance). Therefore it changes at a different 
rate to the energy. In fact, it changes more slowly than the energy 
does. Therefore, the NVF calculated at the detector will he more 
similar to the NVF calculated at the embedder than the respective 
of watermark to image energy will change; it will increase for low 
pass attacks, and decrease for the unsharp mask. This in tum will 
mean that the thresholding process will be more and less able, re- 
Figure 3 gives results showing how the average watermark co- 
herence changes between different wavelet decomposition levels 
for a number of different images e.g. the average of pl - h. It 
can be seen for a given decomposition level and attack, the varia- 
tion between images is generally small. In addition, it should also 
be noted that the profiles for the different attacks are quite differ- 
ent. For example, the results for the unsharp mask (Figure 3(c)) 
are higher for the diagonal subbands in levels 1 and 2 than for the 
untampered case (Figure 3(h)). The frequency response of the un- 
sharp filter has its largest magnitude in the high frequency comers 
of the Fourier domain, thus one would expect it to most affect the 
diagonal components of the image. This correlates with what was 
observed previously. It may also be noted that the average dif- 
ference in coherence for the untampered case is close to zero for 
all the high frequency subbands, which is what one might hope for. 
Conversely, the average change for either type of compression (see 
Figures 3(d) and 3(a) for P E G  baseline and IPEGZOOO compres- 
sion respectively) is generally negative, rather then positive as was 
the case for the unsharp mask. This is also as expected. Interest- 
ingly, JPEGZ000 also has a noticeable effect on wavelet subband 
levels 3 & 4, which none of the other attacks do. The fluctuation 
in all the results in the level 3 & 4 suhhands is due to the fact that 
p, lor Iena: j2k-01 p, for lem: nothing 
1 
image energies at the detector and the emhedder. Thus the ratio 0 
spectively, to better separate the watermark from the image. - 1  
(bl 
1 
0 
-1 
(C) (d) 
Figure 2: p l  for Lena for attacks: (a) Compression using 
JPEGZ000 with compression ratio of 100:1, (b) No attack, (c) 
Unsharp mask, and (d) Compression using JPEG baseline with a 
quality factor of 80 
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Figure 3: Average difference between PI and pz for attacks: (a) 
Compression using JPEG2000 with compression ratio of 1001, 
(b) No attack, (c) Unsharp mask, and (d) Compression using 
P E G  baseline with a quality factor of 80 
Table 3: Table showing PSNR (dB) for various attacks compared 
to watermarked untampered version of Lena 
Attack 1 P E G  QF=80 1 12K r = 0.01 1 Unsharp 
PSNR(dB) 1 35.61 1 27.67 I 22.44 
natural images tend to have more energy in the low frequency sub- 
bands, which is also the area in which the Human Visual System 
is most sensitive. Therefore less watermark energy can be embed- 
ded in these regions, with the result that the thresholding process 
will he less able to separate the image and the watermark. This 
in tum will affect PI and p z ,  making them more image dependent 
and thus less predictable. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have presented a novel double-watermarking al- 
gorithm that uses a second reference watermark against which the 
first watermark may be compared to determine not only whether 
the image has been attacked, but also information about the na- 
ture of the attack. We have shown that a variety of different im- 
ages have similar metrics for the same attack, thus suggesting that 
these or other metrics may be used lo discriminate between attacks. 
Additional conclusions are that the use of the double watermark- 
ing strategy is best suited to the wavelet domain, or indeed any 
other domain with both spatial and frequency resolution, as this 
a l low comparisons over different subbands. This, as shown, per- 
mits greater distinctions between the attacks to be observed. 
In the future, there needs to be developed some method of 
classifying different attacks, which must also provide better local- 
isation of the attacks. Also, a larger number of attacks should be 
considered; in particular. the case of replacement needs to be ad- 
dressed. Additional metrics may also need to be developed to al- 
low more accurate separation of the attacks, especially when com- 
paring the unsharp mask and the untampered case. More generally, 
special attention may need to be directed towards the case of the 
linear attack, as it has been shown that this can be more difficult to 
detect than non-linear operations. 
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